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is the same thing） in so far as it reasons。 Therefore we know nothing
to be good or evil save such things as really conduce； &c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXVIII。 The mind's highest good is
the knowledge of God； and the mind's
highest virtue is to know God。
Proof。… The mind is not capable of understanding anything higher than God；
that is （I：Def。vi。）； than a Being absolutely infinite； and without which
（I：xv。） nothing can either be or be conceived； therefore （IV：xxvi。；
&xxvii。）； the mind's highest utility or （IV：Def。i。） good is the knowledge
of God。 Again； the mind is active； only in so far as it understands； and
only to the same extent can it be said absolutely to act virtuously。 The
mind's absolute virtue is therefore to understand。 Now； as we have already
shown； the highest that the mind can understand is God； therefore the
highest virtue of the mind is to understand or to know God。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXIX。 No individual thing； which is
entirely different from our own nature；
can help or check our power of activity； and
absolutely nothing can do us good or harm；
unless it has something in common with our nature。
Proof。… The power of every individual thing； and consequently the power of
man； whereby he exists and operates； can only be determined by an
individual thing （I：xxviii。）； whose nature （II：vi。） must be understood
through the same nature as that； through which human nature is conceived。
Therefore our power of activity； however it be conceived； can be determined
and consequently helped or hindered by the power of any other individual
thing； which has something in common with us； but not by the power of
anything； of which the nature is entirely different from our own； and
since we call good or evil that which is the cause of pleasure or pain
（IV：viii。）； that is （III：xi。Note）； which increases or diminishes； helps
or hinders； our power of activity； therefore； that which is entirely；
different from our nature can neither be to us good nor bad。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXX。 A thing cannot be bad for us
through the quality which it has in common
with our nature； but it is bad for us in so
far as it is contrary to our nature。
Proof。… We call a thing bad when it is the cause of pain （IV：viii。）； that
is （by the Def。； which see in III：xi。Note）； when it diminishes or checks
our power of action。 Therefore； if anything were bad for us through that
quality which it has in common with our nature； it would be able
itself to diminish or check that which it has in common with our nature；
which （III：iv。） is absurd。 Wherefore nothing can be bad for us through
that quality which it has in common with us； but； on the other hand； in
so far as it is bad for us； that is （as we have just shown）； in so far as
it can diminish or check our power of action； it is contrary to our nature。
Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXXI。 In so far as a thing is in harmony
with our nature； it is necessarily good。
Proof。… In so far as a thing is in harmony with our nature； it cannot be
bad for it。 It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent。
If it be assumed that it be neither good nor bad； nothing will follow from
its nature （IV：Def。i。）； which tends to the preservation of our nature；
that is （by the hypothesis）； which tends to the preservation of the thing
itself； but this （III：vi。） is absurd； therefore； in so far as a thing is
in harmony with our nature； it is necessarily good。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。… Hence it follows； that； in proportion as a thing is in harmony
with our nature； so is it more useful or better for us； and vice versa； in
proportion as a thing is more useful for us； so is it more in harmony with
our nature。 For； in so far as it is not in harmony with our nature； it
will necessarily be different therefrom or contrary thereto。 If different；
it can neither be good nor bad （IV：xxix。）； if contrary； it will be contrary
to that which is in harmony with our nature； that is； contrary to what is
good … in short； bad。 Nothing； therefore； can be good； except in so far as
it is in harmony with our nature； and hence a thing is useful； in proportion
as it is in harmony with our nature； and vice versa。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXXII。 In so far as men are a prey
to passion； they cannot； in that respect；
be said to be naturally in harmony。
Proof。 Things； which are said to be in harmony naturally； are understood to
agree in power （III：vii。）； not in want of power or negation； and
consequently not in passion （III：iii。Note）； wherefore men； in so far as
they are a prey to their passions； cannot be said to be naturally in
harmony。 Q。E。D。
Note。… This is also self…evident； for； if we say that white and black only
agree in the fact that neither is red； we absolutely affirm that the do not
agree in any respect。 So； if we say that a man and a stone only agree in the
fact that both are finite … wanting in power； not existing by the necessity
of their own nature； or； lastly； indefinitely surpassed by the power of
external causes … we should certainly affirm that a man and a stone are in
no respect alike； therefore； things which agree only in negation； or in
qualities which neither possess； really agree in no respect。
Prop。 XXXIII。 Men can differ in nature；
in so far as they are assailed by those
emotions； which are passions； or passive
states； and to this extent one and the
same man is variable and inconstant。
Proof。… The nature or essence of the emotions cannot be explained solely
through our essence or nature （III：Def。i。&ii。）； but it must be defined by
the power； that is （III：vii。）； by the nature of external causes in
comparison with our own； hence it follows； that there are as many kinds of
each emotion as there are external objects whereby we are affected
（III：lvi。）； and that men may be differently affected by one and the same
object （III：li）； and to this extent differ in nature； lastly； that one and
the same man may be differently affected towards the same object； and may
therefore be variable and inconstant。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXXIV。 In so far as men are assailed
by emotions which are passions； they can be
contrary one to another。
Proof。… A man； for instance Peter； can be the cause of Paul's feeling pain；
because he （Peter） possesses something similar to that which Paul hates
（III：xvi。）； or because Peter has sole possession of a thing which Paul also
loves （III：xxxii。&Note）； or for other causes （of which the chief are
enumerated in III：lv。Note） ； it may therefore happen that Paul should hate
Peter （Def。 of Emotions： vii。）； consequently it may easily happen also； that
Peter should hate Paul in return； and that each should endeavour to do the
other an injury； （III：xxxix。）； that is （IV：xxx。）； that they should be
contrary one to another。 But the emotion of pain is always a passion
or passive state （III：lix。）； hence men； in so far as they are assailed by
emotions which are passions； can be contrary one to another。 Q。E。D。
Note。… I said that Paul may hate Peter； because he conceives that Peter
possesses something which he （Paul） also loves； from this it seems； at first
sight； to follow； that these two men； through both loving the same thing；
and； consequently； through agreement of their respective natures； stand in
one another's way； if this were so； II：xxx。 and II：xxxi。 would be untrue。
But if we give the matter our unbiased attention； we shall see that the
discrepancy vanishes。 For the two men are not in one another's way in
virtue of the agreement of their natures； that is； through both loving the
same thing； but in virtue of one differing from the other。 For； in so far
as each loves the same thing； the love of each is fostered thereby
（III：xxxi。）； that is （Def。 of the Emotions： vi。） the pleasure of each is
fostered thereby。 Wherefore it is far from being the case； that they are
at variance through both loving the same thing； and through the agreement
in their natures。 The cause for their opposition lies； as I have said；
solely in the fact that they are assumed to differ。 For we assume that
Peter has the idea of the loved object as already in his possession； while
Paul has the idea of the loved object as lost。 Hence the one man will be
affected with pleasure； the other will be affected with pain； and thus they
will be at variance one with another。 We can easily show in like manner；
that all other causes of hatred depend solely on differences； and not on
the agreement between men's natures。
Prop。 XX