按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
benefit of others； which he may rightfully be compelled to perform；
such as to give evidence in a court of justice； to bear his fair share
in the common defence； or in any other joint work necessary to the
interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection； and to
perform certain acts of individual beneficence； such as saving a
fellow creature's life； or interposing to protect the defenceless
against ill…usage； things which whenever it is obviously a man's
duty to do； he may rightfully be made responsible to society for not
doing。 A person may cause evil to others not only by his actions but
by his inaction； and in either case he is justly accountable to them
for the injury。 The latter case； it is true； requires a much more
cautious exercise of compulsion than the former。 To make any one
answerable for doing evil to others is the rule； to make him
answerable for not preventing evil is； comparatively speaking； the
exception。 Yet there are many cases clear enough and grave enough to
justify that exception。 In all things which regard the external
relations of the individual； he is de jure amenable to those whose
interests are concerned； and； if need be； to society as their
protector。 There are often good reasons for not holding him to the
responsibility； but these reasons must arise from the special
expediencies of the case： either because it is a kind of case in which
he is on the whole likely to act better； when left to his own
discretion； than when controlled in any way in which society have it
in their power to control him； or because the attempt to exercise
control would produce other evils； greater than those which it would
prevent。 When such reasons as these preclude the enforcement of
responsibility； the conscience of the agent himself should step into
the vacant judgment seat； and protect those interests of others
which have no external protection； judging himself all the more
rigidly； because the case does not admit of his being made accountable
to the judgment of his fellow creatures。
But there is a sphere of action in which society； as distinguished
from the individual； has； if any； only an indirect interest；
comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which
affects only himself； or if it also affects others； only with their
free； voluntary； and undeceived consent and participation。 When I
say only himself； I mean directly； and in the first instance； for
whatever affects himself； may affect others through himself； and the
objection which may be grounded on this contingency； will receive
consideration in the sequel。 This； then； is the appropriate region
of human liberty。 It comprises； first； the inward domain of
consciousness； demanding liberty of conscience in the most
comprehensive sense； liberty of thought and feeling； absolute
freedom of opinion and sentiment on all subjects； practical or
speculative； scientific； moral； or theological。 The liberty of
expressing and publishing opinions may seem to fall under a
different principle； since it belongs to that part of the conduct of
an individual which concerns other people； but； being almost of as
much importance as the liberty of thought itself； and resting in great
part on the same reasons； is practically inseparable from it。
Secondly； the principle requires liberty of tastes and pursuits； of
framing the plan of our life to suit our own character； of doing as we
like； subject to such consequences as may follow： without impediment
from our fellow creatures； so long as what we do does not harm them；
even though they should think our conduct foolish； perverse； or wrong。
Thirdly； from this liberty of each individual； follows the liberty；
within the same limits； of combination among individuals； freedom to
unite； for any purpose not involving harm to others： the persons
combining being supposed to be of full age； and not forced or
deceived。
No society in which these liberties are not； on the whole；
respected； is free； whatever may be its form of government； and none
is completely free in which they do not exist absolute and
unqualified。 The only freedom which deserves the name； is that of
pursuing our own good in our own way； so long as we do not attempt
to deprive others of theirs； or impede their efforts to obtain it。
Each is the proper guardian of his own health； whether bodily； or
mental and spiritual。 Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each
other to live as seems good to themselves； than by compelling each
to live as seems good to the rest。
Though this doctrine is anything but new； and； to some persons；
may have the air of a truism； there is no doctrine which stands more
directly opposed to the general tendency of existing opinion and
practice。 Society has expended fully as much effort in the attempt
（according to its lights） to compel people to conform to its notions
of personal as of social excellence。 The ancient commonwealths thought
themselves entitled to practise； and the ancient philosophers
countenanced； the regulation of every part of private conduct by
public authority； on the ground that the State had a deep interest
in the whole bodily and mental discipline of every one of its
citizens； a mode of thinking which may have been admissible in small
republics surrounded by powerful enemies； in constant peril of being
subverted by foreign attack or internal commotion； and to which even a
short interval of relaxed energy and self…command might so easily be
fatal that they could not afford to wait for the salutary permanent
effects of freedom。 In the modern world； the greater size of political
communities； and； above all； the separation between spiritual and
temporal authority （which placed the direction of men's consciences in
other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs）；
prevented so great an interference by law in the details of private
life； but the engines of moral repression have been wielded more
strenuously against divergence from the reigning opinion in
self…regarding； than even in social matters； religion； the most
powerful of the elements which have entered into the formation of
moral feeling； having almost always been governed either by the
ambition of a hierarchy； seeking control over every department of
human conduct； or by the spirit of Puritanism。 And some of those
modern reformers who have placed themselves in strongest opposition to
the religions of the past； have been noway behind either churches or
sects in their assertion of the right of spiritual domination： M。
Comte； in particular； whose social system； as unfolded in his
Systeme de Politique Positive； aims at establishing （though by moral
more than by legal appliances） a despotism of society over the
individual； surpassing anything contemplated in the political ideal of
the most rigid disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers。
Apart from the peculiar tenets of individual thinkers； there is also
in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch unduly
the powers of society over the individual； both by the force of
opinion and even by that of legislation； and as the tendency of all
the changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society； and
diminish the power of the individual； this encroachment is not one
of the evils which tend spontaneously to disappear； but； on the
contrary； to grow more and more formidable。 The disposition of
mankind； whether as rulers or as fellow…citizens； to impose their
own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others； is so
energetically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst
feelings incident to human nature； that it is hardly ever kept under
restraint by anything but want of power； and as the power is not
declining； but growing； unless a strong barrier of moral conviction
can be raised against the mischief； we must expect； in the present
circumstances of the world； to see it increase。
It will be convenient for the argument； if； instead of at once
entering upon the general thesis； we confine ourselves in the first
instance to a single branch of it； on which the principle here
stated is； if not fully； yet to a certain point； recognised by the
current opinions。 This one branch is the Liberty of Thought： from
which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of speaking and
of writing。 Although these liberties； to some considerable amount；
form part of the political morality of all countries which profess
religious toleration and free institutions； the grounds； both
philosophical and practical； on which they rest； are perhaps not so
familiar to the general mind； nor so thoroughly appreciated by many
even of the leaders