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th　closed　doors　upon　the　nature　of　all　treaties；　and　upon　the　conduct　of　the　government　as　evinced　in　the　nomination　of　the　officers　of　State。　　It　also　gives　to　the　Senate　a　considerable　control　over　the　foreign　relations　of　the　government。　　I　believe　that　this　power　is　often　used；　and　that　by　it　the　influence　of　the　Senate　is　raised　much　above　that　of　the　Lower　House。　　This　influence　is　increased　again　by　the　advantage　of　that　superior　statecraft　and　political　knowledge　which　the　six　years　of　the　Senator　gives　him　over　the　two　years　of　the　Representative。　　The　tried　Representative；　moreover；　very　frequently　blossoms　into　a　Senator　but　a　Senator　does　not　frequently　fade　into　a　Representative。　　Such　occasionally　is　the　case；　and　it　is　not　even　unconstitutional　for　an　ex…President　to　reappear　in　either　House。　　Mr。　Benton；　after　thirty　years'　service　in　the　Senate；　sat　in　the　House　of　Representatives。　　Mr。　Crittenden；　who　was　returned　as　Senator　by　Kentucky；　I　think　seven　times；　now　sits　in　the　Lower　House；　and　John　Quincy　Adams　appeared　as　a　Representative　from　Massachusetts　after　he　had　filled　the　presidential　chair。　And；　moreover；　the　Senate　of　the　United　States　is　not　debarred　from　an　interference　with　money　bills；　as　the　House　of　Lords　is　debarred　with　us。　　〃All　bills　for　raising　revenue；〃　says　the　seventh　section　of　the　first　article　of　the　Constitution；　〃shall　originate　with　the　House　of　Representatives；　but　the　Senate　may　propose　or　concur　with　amendments　as　on　other　bills。〃　　By　this　the　Senate　is　enabled　to　have　an　authority　in　the　money　matters　of　the　nation　almost　equal　to　that　held　by　the　Lower　Housean　authority　quite　sufficient　to　preserve　to　it　the　full　influence　of　its　other　powers。　　With　us　the　House　of　Commons　is　altogether　in　the　ascendant；　because　it　holds　and　jealously　keeps　to　itself　the　exclusive　command　of　the　public　purse。　Congress　can　levy　custom　duties　in　the　United　States；　and　always　has　done　so；　hitherto　the　national　revenue　has　been　exclusively　raised　from　custom　duties。　　It　cannot　levy　duties　on　exports。　　It　can　levy　excise　duties；　and　is　now　doing　so；　hitherto　it　has　not　done　so。　　It　can　levy　direct　taxes；　such　as　an　income　tax　and　a　property　tax；　it　hitherto　has　not　done　so；　but　now　must　do　so。　　It　must　do　so；　I　think　I　am　justified　in　saying；　but　its　power　of　doing　this　is　so　hampered　by　constitutional　enactment；　that　it　would　seem　that　the　Constitution　as　regards　this　heading　must　be　altered　before　any　scheme　can　be　arranged　by　which　a　moderately　just　income　tax　can　be　levied　and　collected。　　This　difficulty　I　have　already　mentioned；　but　perhaps　it　will　be　well　that　I　should　endeavor　to　make　the　subject　more　plain。　　It　is　specially　declared：　〃That　all　duties；　imposts；　and　excises　shall　be　uniform　throughout　the　united　States。〃　　And　again：　〃That　no　capitation　or　other　direct　tax　shall　be　laid；　unless　in　proportion　to　the　census　or　enumeration　hereinbefore　directed　to　be　taken。〃　　And　again；　in　the　words　before　quoted：　〃Representatives　and　direct　taxes　shall　be　apportioned　among　the　several　States　which　shall　be　included　in　this　Union；　according　to　their　respective　numbers。〃　　By　these　repeated　rules　it　has　been　intended　to　decree　that　the　separate　States　shall　bear　direct　taxation　according　to　their　population　and　the　consequent　number　of　their　Representatives；　and　this　intention　has　been　made　so　clear　that　no　direct　taxation　can　be　levied　in　opposition　to　it　without　an　evident　breach　of　the　Constitution。　　To　explain　the　way　in　which　this　will　work；　I　will　name　the　two　States　of　Rhode　Island　and　Iowa　as　opposed　to　each　other；　and　the　two　States　of　Massachusetts　and　Indiana　as　opposed　to　each　other。　　Rhode　Island　and　Massachusetts　are　wealthy　Atlantic　States；　containing；　as　regards　enterprise　and　commercial　success；　the　cream　of　the　population　of　the　United　States。　　Comparing　them　in　the　ratio　of　population；　I　believe　that　they　are　richer　than　any　other　States。　　They　return　between　them　thirteen　Representatives；　Rhode　Island　sending　two　and　Massachusetts　eleven。　　Iowa　and　Indiana　also　send　thirteen　Representatives；　Iowa　sending　two；　and　being　thus　equal　to　Rhode　Island；　Indiana　sending　eleven；　and　being　thus　equal　to　Massachusetts。　　Iowa　and　Indiana　are　Western　States；　and　though　I　am　not　prepared　to　say　that　they　are　the　poorest　States　of　the　Union；　I　can　assert　that　they　are　exactly　opposite　in　their　circumstances　to　Rhode　Island　and　Massachusetts。　　The　two　Atlantic　States　of　New　England　are　old　established；　rich；　and　commercial。　The　two　Western　States　I　have　named　are　full　of　new　immigrants；　are　comparatively　poor；　and　are　agricultural。　　Nevertheless　any　direct　taxation　levied　on　those　in　the　East　and　on　those　in　the　West　must　be　equal　in　its　weight。　　Iowa　must　pay　as　much　as　Rhode　Island；　Indiana　must　pay　as　much　as　Massachusetts。　　But　Rhode　Island　and　Massachusetts　could　pay；　without　the　sacrifice　of　any　comfort　to　its　people；　without　any　sensible　suffering；　an　amount　of　direct　taxation　which　would　crush　the　States　of　Iowa　and　Indianawhich　indeed　no　tax　gatherer　could　collect　out　of　those　States。　　Rhode　Island　and　Massachusetts　could　with　their　ready　money　buy　Iowa　and　Indiana；　and　yet　the　income　tax　to　be　collected　from　the　poor　States　is　to　be　the　same　in　amount　as　that　collected　from　the　rich　States。　　Within　each　individual　State　the　total　amount　of　income　tax　or　of　other　direct　taxation　to　be　levied　from　that　State　may　be　apportioned　as　the　State　may　think　fit；　but　an　income　tax　of　two　per　cent。　on　Rhode　Island　would　probably　produce　more　than　an　income　tax　of　ten　per　cent。　in　Iowa；　whereas　Rhode　Island　could　pay　an　income　tax　of　ten　per　cent。　easier　than　could　Iowa　one　of　two　per　cent。　It　would　in　fact　appear　that　the　Constitution　as　at　present　framed　is　fatal　to　all　direct　taxation。　　Any　law　for　the　collection　of　direct　taxation　levied　under　the　Constitution　would　produce　internecine　quarrel　between　the　Western　States　and　those　which　border　on　the　Atlantic。　　The　Western　States　would　not　submit　to　the　taxation。　　The　difficulty　which　one　here　feels　is　that　which　always　attends　an　attempt　at　finality　in　political　arrangements。　　One　would　be　inclined　to　say　at　once　that　the　law　should　be　altered；　and　that　as　the　money　required　is　for　the　purposes　of　the　Union　and　for　State　purposes；　such　a　change　should　be　made　as　would　enable　Congress　to　levy　an　income　tax　on　the　general　income　of　the　nation。　　But　Congress　cannot　go　beyond　the　Constitution。　It　is　true　that　the　Constitution　is　not　final；　and　that　it　contains　an　express　article　ordaining　the　manner　in　which　it　may　be　amended。　And　perhaps　I　may　as　well　explain　here　the　manner　in　which　this　can　be　done；　although　by　doing　so　I　am　departing　from　the　order　in　which　the　Constitution　is　written。　　It　is　not　final；　and　amendments　have　been　made　to　it。　　But　the　making　of　such　amendments　is　an　operation　so　ponderous　and　troublesome　that　the　difficulty　attached　to　any　such　change　envelops　the　Constitution　with　many　of　the　troubles　of　finality。　　With　us　there　is　nothing　beyond　an　act　of　Parliament。　　An　act　of　Parliament　with　us　cannot　be　unconstitutional。　　But　no　such　power　has　been　confided　to　Congress；　or　to　Congress　and　the　President　together。　　No　amendment　of　the　Constitution　can　be　made　without　the　sanction　of　the　State　legislatures。　　Congress　may　propose　any　amendments；　as　to　the　expediency　of　which　two…thirds　of　both　Houses　shall　be　agreed；　but　before　such　amendments　can　be　accepted　they　must　be　ratified　by　the　legislatures　of　three…fourths　of　the　States；　or　by　conventions　in　three…fourths　of　the　States；　〃as　the　one　or　the　other　mode　of　ratification　may　be　proposed　by　Congress。〃　　Or　Congress；　instead　of　proposing　the　amendments；　may；　on　an　application　from　the　legislatures　of　two…thirds　of　the　different　States；　call　a　convention　for　the　proposing　of　them。　　In　which　latter　case　the　ratification　by　the　different　States　must　be　made　after　the　same　fashion　as　that　required　in　the　former　case。　　I　do　not　know　that　I　have　succeeded　in　making　clearly　intelligible　the　circumstances　under　which　the　Constitution　can　be　amended；　but　I　think　I　may　have　succeeded　in　explaining　that　those　circumstances　are　difficult　and　tedious。　　In　a　matter　of　taxation　why　should　States　agree　to　an　alteration　proposed　with　the　very　object　of　increasing　their　proportion　of　the　national　burden？　　But　unless　such　States　will　agreeunless　Rhode　Island；　Massachusetts；　and　New　York　will　consent　to　put　their　own　necks　into　the　yokedirect　taxation　cannot　be　levied　on　them　in　a　manner　available　for　national　purposes。　　I　do　believe　that　Rhode　Island　and　Massachusetts　at　present　possess　a　patriotism　sufficient　for　such　an　act。　　But　the　mode　of　doing　the　work　will　create　disagreement；　or　at　any　rate；　tedious　delay　and　difficulty。　　How　shall　the　Constitution　be　constitutionally　amended　while　one…third　of　the　States　are　in　revolt？　In　the　eighth　section　of　its　first　article　the　Constitution　gives　a　list　of　the　duties　which　Congress　shall　performof　things；　in　short；　which　it　shall　do　or　shall　have　power　to　do：　To　raise　taxes；　to　regulate　commerce　and　the　naturalization　of　citizens；　to　coin　money；　and　protect　it　when　coined；　to　establish　postal　communication；　to　make　laws　for　defense　of　patents　and　copyrights；　t