按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
as it is by outward circumstances … the complex changes in configuration and grouping of clouds；
and the like … ought not to be ranked higher than the equally casual fancies of the mind which
surrenders itself to its own caprices。 The wonderment with which such phenomena are welcomed
is a most abstract frame of mind； from which one should advance to a closer insight into the inner
harmony and uniformity of nature。
？
Of contingency in respect of the Will it is especially important to form a proper estimate。 The
Freedom of the Will is an expression that often means mere free choice； or the will in the form of
contingency。 Freedom of choice； or the capacity for determining ourselves towards one thing or
another； or is undoubtedly a vital element in the will （which is in its very notion free）； but instead of
being freedom itself； it is it is only in the first instance a freedom in form。 The genuinely free will；
which includes free choice as suspended； is conscious to itself that its content is intrinsically firm
and fast； and knows it at the same time to be thoroughly its own。 A will； on the contrary； which
remains standing on the grade of option； even supposing it does decide in favour of what is in
import right and true； is always haunted by the conceit that it might； if it had so pleased； have
decided in favour of the reverse course。 When more narrowly examined； free choice is seen to be
a contradiction； to this extent； that its form and content stand in antithesis。 The matter of choice is
given； and known as a content dependent not on the will itself； but on outward circumstances。 In
reference to such a given content； freedom lies only in the form of choosing； which； as it is only a
freedom in form； may consequently be regarded as freedom only in supposition。 On an ultimate
analysis it will be seen that the same outwardness of circumstances； on which is founded the
content that the will finds to its hand； can alone account for the will giving its decision for the one
and not the other of the two alternatives。
Although contingency； as it has thus been shown； is only one aspect in the whole of actuality； and
therefore not to be mistaken for the whole of actuality； and therefore not to be mistaken for
actuality itself； it has no less than the rest of the forms of the idea its due office in the world of
objects。 This is； in the first place； seen in Nature。 On the surface of Nature； so to speak； Chance
ranges unchecked； and the contingency must simply be recognised； without the pretension
sometimes erroneously ascribed to philosophy； in seeking to find it in a
could…only…be…so…and…not…otherwise。 Nor is contingency less visible in the world of Mind。 The
Will； as we have already remarked； includes contingency under the shape of option or free choice；
but only as a vanishing and abrogated element。 In respect of Mind and its works； just as in the
case of Nature； we must guard against being so far misled by a well…meant endeavour after
rational knowledge； as to try to exhibit the necessity of phenomena which are marked by a
decided contingency； or； as the phrase is； to construe them a priori。 Thus in language （although it
be； as it were； the body of thought） Chance still unquestionably plays a decided part； and the same
is true of the creations of law； of art； etc。
The problem of science； and especially of philosophy； undoubtedly consists in eliciting the
necessity concealed under the semblance of contingency。 That； however； is far from meaning that
the contingent belongs to our subjective conception alone； and must therefore be simply set aside；
if we wish to get at the truth。 All scientific researches which pursue this tendency exclusively lay
themselves open to the charge of mere jugglery and an over…strained precisionism。
§ 146
Condition
When more closely examined； what the aforesaid outward side of actuality
implies is this。 Contingency； which is actuality in its immediacy； is the
self…identical； essentially only as a supposition which is no sooner made than it is
revoked and leaves an existent externality。 In this way； the external contingency is
something pre…supposed； the immediate existence of which is at the same time a
possibility； and has the vocation to be suspended； to be the possibility of
something else。 Now this possibility is the Condition。
§ 146n
The Contingent； as the immediate actuality； is at the same time； the possibility of somewhat else …
no longer however； the abstract possibility which we had at first； but the possibility which is。 And
a possibility existent is a Condition。 By the Condition of a thing we mean first； an existence； in
short an immediate； and secondly the vocation of this immediate to be suspended and subserve the
actualising of something else。 Immediate actuality is in general as such never what it ought to be； it
is a finite actuality with an inherent flaw； and its vocation is to be consumed。 But the other aspect
of actuality is its essentiality。 This is primarily the inside which as a mere possibility is no less
destined to be suspended。 Possibility thus suspended is the issuing of a new actuality； of which the
first immediate actuality was the pre…supposition。 Here we see the alternation which is involved in
the notion of a Condition。 The Conditions of a thing seem at first sight to involve no bias any way。
Really however； an immediate actuality of this kind includes in it the germ of something else
altogether。 At first； this something else is only a possibility： but the form of possibility is soon
suspended and translated into actuality。 This new actuality thus issuing is the very inside of the
immediate actuality which uses it up。 Thus； there comes into being quite another shape of things；
and yet it is not an other： for the first actuality is only put as what it in essence was。 The conditions
which are sacrificed； which feel to the ground and are spent； only unite with themselves in the other
actuality。 Such in general is the nature of the process of actuality。 The actual is no mere case of
immediate Being； but； as essential Being； a suspension of its own immediacy； and thereby
mediating itself with itself。
§ 147
＇c＇ Real Possibility
When this externality （of actuality） is thus developed into a circle of the two
categories of possibility and immediate actuality； showing the intermediation of
the one by the other； it is what is called Real Possibility。 Being such a circle；
further； it is the totality； and thus the content； the actual fact or affair in its
all…round definiteness。 While in like manner； if we look at the distinction between
the two characteristics in this unity； it realises the concrete totality of the form；
the immediate self…translation of inner into outer； and of outer into inner。 This
self…movement of the form is Activity； carrying into effect the fact or affair as a
real ground which is self…suspended to actuality； and carrying into effect the
contingent actuality； the conditions； i。e。 it is their reflection…into…self； and their
self…suspension to another actuality of the actual fact。 If all the conditions are at
hand； the fact （event） must be actual； and the fact itself is one of the conditions：
for being in the first place only inner； it is in fact itself only pre…supposed。
Developed actuality； as the coincident alternation of inner and outer； the
alternation of their opposite motions combined into a single motion； is Necessity。
Necessity
Necessity has been defined； and rightly so； as the union of possibility and
actuality。 This mode of expression； however； gives a superficial and therefore
unintelligible description of the very difficult notion of necessity。 It is difficult
because it is the notion itself； only that its stages or factors are still as actualities；
which are yet at the same time to be viewed as forms only； collapsing and
transient。 In the two following paragraphs； therefore； an exposition of the factors
which constitute necessity must be given at greater length。
§ 147n
Blind Necessity
When anything is said to be necessary； the first question we ask is： Why？ Anything necessary
accordingly comes before us as something due to a supposition； the result of certain antecedents。
If we go no further than mere derivation from antecedents； however； we have not gained a
complete notion of what necessity means。 What is merely derivative； is what it is； not through itself；
but through something else： and in this way； it too is merely contingent。 What is necessary on the
other hand； we would have to be what it is through itself： and thus； although derivative； it must still
contain the antecedent whence it is derived as a vanishing element in itself。 Hence we say of what
is necessary； 'It is'。 We thus hold it to be simple； self…relation； in which all dependence on
something else is removed。
Necessity is often said to be blind。 If that means that in the process of necessit