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If every nation was already in possession of the territory
which is necessary for its internal development； and for the
maintenance of its political； industrial； and commercial
independence； then every conquest of territory would be contrary to
sound policy； because by the unnatural increase of territory the
jealousy of the nation which is thus encroached upon would be
excited and kept alive； and consequently the sacrifices which the
conquering nation would have to make for retaining such provinces
would be immeasurably greater than the advantages accruing from
their possession。 A just and wise apportionment of territory is；
however； at this day not to be thought of； because this question is
complicated by manifold interests of another nature。 At the same
time it must not be ignored that rectification of territory must be
reckoned among the most important requirements of the nations； that
striving to attain it is legitimate； that indeed in many cases it
is a justifiable reason for war。
Further causes of antipathy between the nations are； at the
present time； the diversity of their interests in respect to
manufactures； commerce； navigation； naval power； and colonial
possessions； also the difference in their degrees of civilisation；
of religion； and of political condition。 All these interests are
complicated in manifold ways through the interests of dynasties and
powers。
The causes of antipathy are； on the other hand； causes of
sympathy。 The less powerful nations sympathise against the most
powerful； those whose independence is endangered sympathise against
the aggressors； territorial powers against naval supremacy； those
whose industry and commerce are defective sympathise against those
who are striving for an industrial and commercial monopoly； the
half…civilised against the civilised； those who are subjects of a
monarchy against those whose government is entirely or partially
democratic。
Nations at this time pursue their own interests and sympathies
by means of alliances of those who are like…minded and have like
interests against the interests and tendencies which conflict with
theirs。 As； however； these interests and tendencies conflict with
one another in various ways； these alliances are liable to change。
Those nations who are friends to…day may be enemies to…morrow； and
vice vers猓弧s soon as ever some one of the great interests or
principles is at stake by which they feel themselves repelled from
or drawn towards one another。
Politicians have long felt that the equalisation of the nations
must be their ultimate aim。 That which people call the maintenance
of the European balance of power has always been nothing else than
the endeavours of the less powerful to impose a check on the
encroachments of the more powerful。 Yet politics have not seldom
confounded their proximate object with their ultimate one； and vice
vers狻�
The proximate task of politics always consists in clearly
perceiving in what respect the alliance and equalisation of the
different interests is at the moment most pressing； and to strive
that until this equalisation is attained all other questions may be
suspended and kept in the background。
When the dynastic； monarchic； and aristocratic interests of
Europe allied themselves against the revolutionary tendencies of
1789； disregarding all considerations regarding power and commerce；
their policy was a correct one。
It was just as correct when the French Empire introduced the
tendency of conquest in place of that of revolution。
Napoleon sought by his Continental system to establish a
Continental coalition against the predominant naval and commercial
power of England； but in order to succeed； it was necessary for
him； first of all； to take away from the Continental nations the
apprehension of being conquered by France。 He failed； because on
their part the fear of his supremacy on land greatly outweighed the
disadvantages which they suffered from the naval supremacy。
With the fall of the French Empire； the object of the great
alliance ceased。 From that time forth； the Continental powers were
menaced neither by the revolutionary tendencies nor by the lust of
conquest of France。 England's predominance in manufactures；
navigation； commerce； colonial possessions； and naval power； had；
on the other hand； enormously increased during the conflicts
against the Revolution and against the French conquest。 From that
time forth； it became the interest of the Continental powers to
ally themselves with France against the commercial and naval
predominance。 Solely from fear of the skin of the dead lion； the
Continental powers did not heed sufficiently the living leopard who
had hitherto fought in their ranks。 The Holy Alliance was a
political error。
This error also brought about its own punishment through the
revolution of Italy。 The Holy Alliance had unnecessarily called
into life a counter force which no longer existed； or which at
least would not for a long time have revived again。 Fortunately for
the Continental powers； the dynasty of July contrived to appease
the revolutionary tendency in France。 France concluded the alliance
with England in the interests of the dynasty of July and of
strengthening the constitutional monarchy。 England concluded it in
the interest of the maintenance of her commercial supremacy。
The Franco…English alliance ceased as soon as ever the dynasty
of July and the constitutional monarchy in France felt themselves
to be sufficiently firmly established； but； on the other hand； the
interests of France in respect of naval power； navigation；
commerce； industry； and foreign possessions came again more to the
front。 It is clear that France has again an equal interest with the
other Continental powers in these questions； and the establishing
of a Continental alliance against the naval predominance of England
appears to be becoming a question of the day； provided the dynasty
of July can succeed in creating perfect unity of will between the
different organs of State administration； also to thrust into the
background those territorial questions which are excited by the
revolutionary tendencies； and entirely to appease in the minds of
the monarchical Continental powers the fear of the tendencies of
France towards revolution and aggression。
Nothing； however； at this time so greatly impedes a closer
union of the continent of Europe as the fact that the centre of it
still never takes the position for which it is naturally fitted。
Instead of being a mediator between the east and the west of that
continent； on all questions of arrangement of territory； of the
principle of their constitutions； of national independence and
power； for which it is qualified by its geographical position； by
its federal constitution which excludes all apprehension of
aggression in the minds of neighbouring nations； by its religious
toleration； and its cosmopolitical tendencies； and finally by its
civilisation and the elements of power which it possesses； this
central part of Europe constitutes at present the apple of discord
for which the east and the west contend； while each party hopes to
draw to its own side this middle power； which is weakened by want
of national unity； and is always uncertainly wavering hither and
thither。
If； on the other hand； Germany could constitute itself with the
maritime territories which appertain to it； with Holland； Belgium；
and Switzerland； as a powerful commercial and political whole if
this mighty national body could fuse representative institutions
with the existing monarchical； dynastic； and aristocratic
interests； so far as these are compatible with one another then
Germany could secure peace to the continent of Europe for a long
time； and at the same time constitute herself the central point of
a durable Continental alliance。
That the naval power of England greatly exceeds that of all
other nations； if not on the number of ships； yet certainly in
fighting power that hence the nations which are less powerful at
sea can only match England at sea by uniting their own naval power；
is clear。 From hence it follows； that every nation which is less
powerful at sea has an interest in the maintenance and prosperity
of the naval power of all other nations who are similarly weak at
sea； and further； that fractions of other nation