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the former one。 But； how this too place； how the craving desire
produced this effect； was acknowledged to be a mystery patent only to
a Buddha。〃 （Rhys Davids； Hibbert Lectures； P。 95。）
Among the many parallelisms of Stoicism and Buddhism； it is curious to
find one for this Tanha； 〃thirst；〃 or 〃craving desire〃 for life。
Seneca writes （Epist。 lxxvi。 18）： 〃Si enim ullum aliud est bonum quam
honestum； sequetur nos aviditas vitae aviditas rerum vitam
instruentium： quod est intolerabile infinitum； vagum。〃
Note 8 （P。 66）。
〃The distinguishing characteristic of Buddhism was that it started a
new line； that it looked upon the deepest questions men have to solve
from an entirely different standpoint。 It swept away from the field of
its vision the whole of the great soul theory which had hitherto so
completely filled and dominated the minds of the superstitious and the
thoughtful alike。 For the first time in the history of the world； it
proclaimed a salvation which each man could gain for himself and by
himself； in this world； during this life； without any the least
reference to God； or to Gods； either great or small。 Like the
Upanishads； it placed the first importance on knowledge； but it was no
longer a knowledge of God； it was a clear perception of the real
nature； as ＇97＇ they supposed it to be； of men and things。 And it added
to the necessity of knowledge； the necessity of purity； of courtesy；
of uprightness； of peace and of a universal love far reaching； grown
great and beyond measure。〃 （Rhys Davids； Hibbert Lectures； p。 29。）
The contemporary Greek philosophy takes an analogous direction。
According to Heracleitus； the universe was made neither by Gods nor
men； but； from all eternity； has been； and to all eternity； will be；
immortal fire； glowing and fading in due measure。 （Mullach； Heracliti
Fragmenta； 27。） And the part assigned by his successors； the Stoics；
to the knowledge and the volition of the 〃wise man〃 made their
Divinity （for logical thinkers） a subject for compliments； rather than
a power to be reckoned with。 In Hindu speculation the 〃Arahat；〃 still
more the 〃Buddha；〃 becomes the superior of Brahma； the stoical 〃wise
man〃 is； at least； the equal of Zeus。
Berkeley affirms over and over again that no idea can be formed of a
soul or spirit〃If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here
delivered； let him but reflect and try if he can form any idea of
power or active being； and whether he hath ideas of two principal
powers marked by the names of will and understanding distinct from
each other； as well as from a third idea of substance or being in
general； with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject
of the aforesaid power； which is signified by the name soul or spirit。
This is what some hold but； so far as I can see； the words will； soul；
spirit； do not stand for different ideas or； in truth； for any idea at
all； but for something which is very different from ideas； and which；
being an agent； cannot be like unto or represented by Any idea
whatever ＇though it must be owned at the same time； that we have some
notion of soul； spirit； and the operations of the mind； such as
willing； loving； hating； inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning
of these words〃。 （The Principles of Human Knowledge； lxxvi。 See also
sections lxxxix。； cxxxv。； cxlv。）
It is open to discussion； I think； whether it is possible to have
〃some notion〃 of that of which we can form no 〃idea。〃
Berkeley attaches several predicates to the 〃perceiving active being
mind； spirit； soul or myself〃 （Parts I。 II。） It is said； for example；
to be 〃indivisible； incorporeal； unextended； and incorruptible。〃 The
predicate indivisible； though negative in form； has highly positive
consequences。 For； if 〃perceiving active being〃 is strictly
indivisible； man's soul must be one with the Divine spirit： which is
good Hindu or Stoical doctrine； but hardly orthodox Christian
philosophy。 If； on the other hand； the 〃substance〃 of active
perceiving 〃being〃 is actually divided into the one Divine and
innumerable human entities； how can the predicate 〃indivisible〃 be
rigorously applicable to it？
Taking the words cited； as they stand； the amount to the denial of the
possibility of any knowledge of substance。 〃Matter〃 having been
resolved into mere affections of 〃spirit〃； 〃spirit〃 melts away into an
admittedly inconceivable and unknowable ＇99＇ hypostasis of thought and
powerconsequently the existence of anything in the universe beyond a
flow of phenomena is a purely hypothetical assumption。 Indeed a
pyrrhonist might raise the objection that if 〃esse〃 is 〃percipi〃
spirit itself can have no existence except as a perception；
hypostatized into a 〃self；〃 or as a perception of some other spirit。
In the former case； objective reality vanishes； in the latter； there
would seem to be the need of an infinite series of spirits each
perceiving the others。
It is curious to observe how very closely the phraseology of Berkeley
sometimes approaches that of the Stoics： thus （cxlviii。） 〃It seems to
be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they cannot see God。
。 。 But； alas； we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of
all things with a more full and clear view； than we do any of our
fellow…creatures 。 。 。 we do at all times and in all places perceive
manifest tokens of the Divinity： everything we see； hear； feel； or any
wise perceive by sense； being a sign or effect of the power of God〃 。
。 。 cxlix。 〃It is therefore plain； that nothing can be more evident to
any one that is capable of the least reflection； than the existence of
God； or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds； producing in
them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect
us； on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence； in short； in
whom we live and move and have our being。〃 cl。 〃＇But you will say hath
Nature no share in the production of natural things； and must they all
be ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God？ 。。。 if by
Nature is ＇100＇ meant some being distinct from God； as well as from
the laws of nature and things perceived by sense； I must confess that
word is to me an empty sound； without any intelligible meaning annexed
to it。＇ Nature in this acceptation is a vain Chimaera introduced by
those heathens； who had not just notions of the omnipresence and
infinite perfection of God。〃
Compare Seneca （De Beneficiis； iv。 7）：
〃Natura； inquit； haec mihi praestat。 Non intelligis te； quum hoc
dicis； mutare Nomen Deo？ Quid enim est aliud Natura quam Deus； et
divina ratio； toti mundo et partibus ejus inserta？ Quoties voles tibi
licet aliter hunc auctorem rerum nostrarum compellare； et Jovem illum
optimum et maximum rite dices； et tonantem； et statorem： qui non； ut
historici tradiderunt； ex eo quod post votum susceptum acies Romanorum
fugientum stetit； sed quod stant beneficio ejus omnina； stator；
stabilitorque est： hunc eundem et fatum si dixeris； non mentieris； nam
quum fatum nihil aliud est； quam series implexa causarum； ille est
prima omnium causa； ea qua caeterae pendent。〃 It would appear；
therefore； that the good Bishop is somewhat hard upon the 〃heathen；〃
of whose words his own might be a paraphrase。
There is yet another direction in which Berkeley's philosophy； I will
not say agrees with Gautama's； but at any rate helps to make a
fundamental dogma of Buddhism intelligible。
〃I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure； and vary and shift
the scene as often as I think fit。 It is no more than willing； and
straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy： and by the same
power ＇101＇ it is obliterated； and makes way for another。 This making
and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active。
This much is certain and grounded on experience。 。 。〃 （Principles；
xxviii。）
A good many of us； I fancy； have reason to think that experience tells
them very much the contrary； and are painfully familiar with the
obsession of the mind by ideas which cannot be obliterated by any
effort of the will and steadily refuse to make way for others。 But
what I desire to point out is that if Gautama was equally confident
that he could 〃make and unmake〃 ideasthen； since he had resolved
self into a group of ideal phantomsthe possibility of abolishing
self by volition naturally followed。
Note 9 （P。 68）。
According to Buddhism； the relation of one life to the next is merely
that borne by the flame of one lamp to the flame of another lamp which
is set alight by it。 To the 〃Arahat〃 or adept 〃no outward form； no
compound thing； no creature； no creator； no existence of any kind；
must appear to be other than a temporary collocation of its component
parts； fated inevitably to be dissolved。〃（Rhys Davids； Hibbert
Lectures； p。 211。）
The self is nothing but a group of phenomena held together by the
desire of life； when that desire shall have ceased； 〃the Karma of that
particular chain of lives will cease to influence any longer any
distinct individual； and there will be no more birth； ＇102＇ for birth；
decay； and death； grief； lamentation； and despair will have come； so
far as regards that chain of lives； for ever to a