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other conditions being equal； fainter than an
emotion towards a thing past。
Proof。… In so far as we conceive a thing as contingent； we are not
affected by the image of any other thing； which asserts the existence
of the said thing （IV：Def。iii。）； but； on the other hand （by hypothesis）；
we conceive certain things excluding its present existence。 But； in so
far as we conceive it in relation to time past； we are assumed to
conceive something； which recalls the thing to memory； or excites the
image thereof （II：xviii。&Note）； which is so far the same as regarding
it as present （II：xvii。Coroll。）。 Therefore （IV：ix。） an emotion towards a
thing contingent； which we know does not exist in the present； is fainter；
other conditions being equal； than an emotion towards a thing past。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XIV。 A true knowledge of good and evil
cannot check any emotion by virtue of being true；
but only in so far as it is considered as an emotion。
Proof。… An emotion is an idea； whereby the mind affirms of its body a
greater or less force of existing than before （by the general Definition
of the Emotions）； therefore it has no positive quality； which can be
destroyed by the presence of what is true； consequently the knowledge
of good and evil cannot； by virtue oi being true； restrain any emotion。
But； in so far as such knowledge is an emotion （IV：viii。） if it have
more strength for restraining emotion； it will to that extent be able
to restrain the given emotion。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XV。 Desire arising from the
knowledge of good and bad can be
quenched or checked by many of the
other desires arising from the
emotions whereby we are assailed。
Proof。… From the true knowledge of good and evil； in so far as it is an
emotion； necessarily arises desire （Def。 of the Emotions； i。）； the strength
of which is proportioned to the strength of the emotion wherefrom it arises
（III：xxxvii。）。 But； inasmuch as this desire arises （by hypothesis） from the
fact of our truly understanding anything； it follows that it is also
present with us； in so far as we are active （III：i。）； and must therefore
be understood through our essence only （III：Def。ii。）； consequently
（III：vii。） its force and increase can be defined solely by human power。
Again； the desires arising from the emotions whereby we are assailed are
stronger； in proportion as the said emotions are more vehement； wherefore
their force and increase must be defined solely by the power of external
causes； which； when compared with our own power； indefinitely surpass it
（IV：iii。）； hence the desires arising from like emotions may be more
vehement； than the desire which arises from a true knowledge of good and
evil； and may； consequently； control or quench it。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XVI。 Desire arising from the knowledge
of good and evil； in so far as such knowledge
regards what is future； may be more easily
controlled or quenched； than the desire for
what is agreeable at the present moment。
Proof。… Emotion towards a thing； which we conceive as future； is fainter
than emotion towards a thing that is present （IV：ix。Coroll。）。 But desire；
which arises from the true knowledge of good and evil； though it be
concerned with things which are good at the moment； can be quenched
or controlled by any headstrong desire （by the last Prop。； the proof
whereof is of universal application）。 Wherefore desire arising from
such knowledge； when concerned with the future； can be more easily
controlled or quenched； &c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XVII。 Desire arising from the true
knowledge of good and evil； in so far as
such knowledge is concerned with what is
contingent； can be controlled far more
easily still； than desire for things
that are present。
Proof。… This Prop。 is proved in the same way as the last Prop。 from
IV：xii。Coroll。
Note。… I think I have now shown the reason； why men are moved by opinion
more readily than by true reason； why it is that the true knowledge of good
and evil stirs up conflicts in the soul； and often yields to every kind of
passion。 This state of things gave rise to the exclamation of the poet：
（Ov。 Met。 vii。20； 〃Video meliora proboque； Deteriora sequor。〃）
The better path I gaze at and approve；
The worse … I follow。〃
Ecclesiastes seems to have had the same thought in his mind； when he says；
〃He who increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow。〃 I have not written the
above with the object of drawing the conclusion； that ignorance is more
excellent than knowledge； or that a wise man is on a par with a fool in
controlling his emotions； but because it is necessary to know the power
and the infirmity of our nature； before we can determine what reason can
do in restraining the emotions； and what is beyond her power。 I have said；
that in the present part I shall merely treat of human infirmity。 The
power of reason over the emotions I have settled to treat separately。
Prop。 XVIII。 Desire arising from pleasure is；
other conditions being equal； stronger than
desire arising from pain。
Proof。… Desire is the essence of a man （Def。 of the Emotions； i。）；
that is； the endeavour whereby a man endeavours to persist in his own
being。 Wherefore desire arising from pleasure is； by the fact of
pleasure being felt； increased or helped； on the contrary； desire
arising from pain is； by the fact of pain being felt； diminished or
hindered； hence the force of desire arising from pleasure must be
defined by human power together with the power of an external cause；
whereas desire arising from pain must be defined by human power only。
Thus the former is the stronger of the two。 Q。E。D。
Note。… In these few remarks I have explained the causes of human infirmity
and inconstancy； and shown why men do not abide by the precepts of reason。
It now remains for me to show what course is marked out for us by reason；
which of the emotions are in harmony with the rules of human reason； and
which of them are contrary thereto。
But； before I begin to prove my Propositions in detailed geometrical
fashion； it is advisable to sketch them briefly in advance； so that
everyone may more readily grasp my meaning。
As reason makes no demands contrary to nature； it demands； that every
man should love himself； should seek that which is useful to him … I mean；
that which is really useful to him； should desire everything which really
brings man to greater perfection； and should； each for himself； endeavour
as far as he can to preserve his own being。 This is as necessarily true；
as that a whole is greater than its part。 （Cf。 III：iv。）
Again； as virtue is nothing else but action in accordance with the
laws of one's own nature （IV：Def。viii。）； and as no one endeavours to
preserve his own being； except in accordance with the laws of his own
nature； it follows； first； that the foundation of virtue is the endeavour
to preserve one's own being； and that happiness consists in man's power
of preserving； his own being； secondly； that virtue is to be desired for
its own sake； and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to
us； for the sake of which we should desire it； thirdly and lastly that
suicides are weak…minded； and are overcome by external causes repugnant to
their nature。 Further； it follows from Postulate iv。 Part。II。； that we can
never arrive at doing without all external things for the preservation of
our being or living； so as to have no relations with things
which are outside ourselves。 Again； if we consider our mind； we see that
our intellect would be more imperfect； if mind were alone； and could
understand nothing besides itself。 There are； then； many things outside
ourselves； which are useful to us； and are； therefore； to be desired。
Of such none can be discerned more excellent； than those which are in
entire agreement with our nature。 For if； for example； two individuals
of entirely the same nature are united； they form a combination twice
as powerful as either of them singly。
Therefore； to man there is nothing more useful than man … nothing；
I repeat； more excellent for preserving their being can be wished for
by men； than that all should so in all points agree； that the minds and
bodies of all should form； as it were； one single mind and one single
body； and that all should； with one consent； as far as they are able；
endeavour to preserve their being； and all with one consent seek what is
useful to them all。 Hence； men who are governed by reason … that is； who
seek wha