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（In I：xxxiii。note。i。； I drew no distinction between possible and
contingent； because there was in that place no need to distinguish
them accurately。）
V。 By conflicting emotions I mean those which draw a man in different
directions； though they are of the same kind； such as luxury and
avarice； which are both species of love； and are contraries； not
by nature； but by accident。
VI。 What I mean by emotion felt towards a thing； future； present； and
past； I explained in III：xviii。；notes。i。；&ii。； which see。
（But I should here also remark； that we can only distinctly conceive
distance of space or time up to a certain definite limit； that is； all
objects distant from us more than two hundred feet； or whose distance
from the place where we are exceeds that which we can distinctly conceive；
seem to be an equal distance from us； and all in the same plane； so also
objects； whose time of existing is conceived as removed from the present
by a longer interval than we can distinctly conceive； seem to be all
equally distant from the present； and are set down； as it were； to the
same moment of time。）
VII。 By an end； for the sake of which we do something； I mean a desire。
VIII。 By virtue （virtus） and power I mean the same thing； that is
（III：vii。）； virtue； in so far as it is referred to man； is a man's
nature or essence； in so far as it has the power of effecting what
can only be understood by the laws of that nature。
AXIOM。
There is no individual thing in nature； than which there is not
another more powerful and strong。 Whatsoever thing be given； there is
something stronger whereby it can be destroyed。
PROPOSITIONS。
Prop。 I。 No positive quality possessed by a
false idea is removed by the presence of
what is true； in virtue of its being true。
Proof。… Falsity consists solely in the privation of knowledge which
inadequate ideas involve （II：xxxv。）； nor have they any positive
quality on account of which they are called false （II：xxxiii。）； contrariwise； in so far as they
are referred to God； they are true
（II：xxxii。）。 Wherefore； if the positive quality possessed by a false
idea were removed by the presence of what is true； in virtue of its
being true； a true idea would then be removed by itself； which
（IV：iii。） is absurd。 Therefore； no positive quality possessed by a
false idea； &c。 Q。E。D。
Note。… This proposition is more clearly understood from II：xvi。Coroll。ii。
For imagination is an idea； which indicates rather the present disposition
of the human body than the nature of the external body； not indeed
distinctly； but confusedly； whence it comes to pass； that the mind is
said to err。 For instance； when we look at the sun； we conceive that it
is distant from us about two hundred feet； in this judgment we err； so
long as we are in ignorance of its true distance； when its true distance
is known； the error is removed； but not the imagination； or； in other
words； the idea of the sun； which only explains tho nature of that
luminary； in so far as the body is affected thereby： wherefore； though
we know the real distance； we shall still nevertheless imagine the sun
to be near us。 For； as we said in III：xxxv。note； we do not imagine the sun
to be so near us； because we are ignorant of its true distance； but because
the mind conceives the magnitude of the sun to the extent that the body is
affected thereby。 Thus； when the rays of the sun falling on the surface of
water are reflected into our eyes； we imagine the sun as if it were in the
water； though we are aware of its real position； and similarly other
imaginations； wherein the mind is deceived whether they indicate the
natural disposition of the body； or that its power of activity is
increased or diminished； are not contrary to the truth； and do not vanish
at its presence。 It happens indeed that； when we mistakenly fear an evil；
the fear vanishes when we hear the true tidings； but the contrary also
happens； namely； that we fear an evil which will certainly come； and our
fear vanishes when we hear false tidings； thus imaginations do not vanish
at the presence of the truth； in virtue of its being true； but because
other imaginations； stronger than the first； supervene and exclude the
present existence of that which we imagined； as I have shown in II：。xvii。
Prop。 II。 We are only passive； in so far as
we are apart of Nature； which cannot be
conceived by itself without other parts。
Proof。… We are said to be passive； when something arises in us； whereof
we are only a partial cause （III：Def。ii。）； that is （III：Def。i。）； something
which cannot be deduced solely from the laws of our nature。 We are passive
therefore in so far as we are a part of Nature； which cannot be conceived
by itself without other parts。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 III。 The force whereby a man persists
in existing is limited； and is infinitely
surpassed by the power of external causes。
Proof。…This is evident from the axiom of this part。 For； when man is
given； there is something else … say A … more powerful； when A is given；
there is something else … say B … more powerful than A； and so on to
infinity； thus the power of man is limited by the power of some other
thing； and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 IV。 It is impossible； that man should
not be a part of Nature； or that he should
be capable of undergoing no changes； save
such as can be understood through his nature
only as their adequate cause。
Proof。… The power； whereby each particular thing； and consequently man；
preserves his being； is the power of God or of Nature （I：xxiv。Coroll。）；
not in so far as it is infinite； but in so far as it can be explained by
the actual human essence （III：vii。）。 Thus the power of man； in so far
as it is explained through his own actual essence； is a part of the
infinite power of God or Nature； in other words； of the essence thereof
（I：xxxiv。）。 This was our first point。 Again； if it were possible； that man
should undergo no changes save such as can be understood solely through
the nature of man； it would follow that he would not be able to die； but
would always necessarily exist； this would be the necessary consequence
of a cause whose power was either finite or infinite； namely； either of
man's power only； inasmuch as he would be capable of removing from himself
all changes which could spring from external causes； or of the infinite
power of Nature； whereby all individual things would be so ordered； that
man should be incapable of undergoing any changes save such as tended
towards his own preservation。 But the first alternative is absurd （by the
last Prop。； the proof of which is universal； and can be applied to all
individual things）。 Therefore； if it be possible； that man should not be
capable of undergoing any changes； save such as can be explained solely
through his own nature； and consequently that he must always （as we have
shown） necessarily exist； such a result must follow from the infinite
power of God； and consequently （I：xvi。） from the necessity of the divine
nature； in so far as it is regarded as affected by the idea of any given
man； the whole order of nature as conceived under the attributes of
extension and thought must be deducible。 It would therefore follow （I：xxi。）
that man is infinite； which （by the first part of this proof） is absurd。
It is； therefore； impossible； that man should not undergo any changes save
those whereof he is the adequate cause。 Q。E。D。
Corollary。… Hence it follows； that man is necessarily always a prey to
his passions； that he follows and obeys the general order of nature； and
that he accommodates himself thereto； as much as the nature of things
demands。
Prop。 V。 The power and increase of every
passion； and its persistence in existing
are not defined by the power； whereby we
ourselves endeavour to persist in existing；
but by the power of an external cause
compared with our own。
Proof。… The essence of a passion cannot be explained through our
essence alone （III：Def。i。&。ii。）； that is （III：vii。）； the power of
a passion cannot be defined by the power； whereby we ourselves
endeavour to persist in existing； but （as is shown in II：xvi。） must
necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause compared
with our own。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 VI。 The force of any passion or emotion
can overcome the rest of a man's activities or
power； so that the emotion b